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Introduction 
Investment in overseas developmental projects 
is a multifaceted effort which involves a variety 
of actors. These include donor governments and 
their departments for international aid, 
international organisations, recipient 
governments and the societies in the recipient 
countries. With relation to the latter, the 
existence of an active civil society has been 
identified as crucial for the advancement of 
socio-political reforms (Putnam 1995; Kaldor 
2003; Neumayer 2005). Certainly, aid providers 
have become more aware of the need to take 
civil society into account when supporting 
initiatives aiming to promote democratisation, 
human rights, and human security in general. 
The United Kingdom’s Department for 
International Development (DFID), and the United 
States Agency for International Development 
(USAID), two of the largest government-
supported aid agencies, have invested resources 
in exploring the importance of civil society in 
recipient countries and the avenues for 
encouraging its further development (DFID 2012; 
Giffen and Judge 2010; USAID 2014). 
 
More recent works on civil society have 
recognised, though, the fact that such actors are 
not confined to particular territorial boundaries. 
Civil society campaigns are often global, 
involving elements that operate at the 
international and transnational levels. One 
element, nevertheless, has been overall 
neglected by both policymakers and scholars 
examining transnational civil society, and that is 
diaspora communities. The refugees of previous 
decades, which have evolved into well-
established communities in the West, have 
traditionally played pivotal roles in the 
reconstruction of their homelands. But as time 
has gone by, they have become involved in other 
aspects of state- and society-building in the 
homeland. 
 
As the paper concludes, while there is 
undoubtedly eagerness among highly 
motivated and talented diasporans to 
contribute to social and political changes in 
the homeland, on the ground, there are 
difficulties and challenges. These challenges 
may limit the contribution and hinder 
diasporan integration in, and contribution to, 
activism in the homeland. Aid providers and 
donors should develop clear strategies to 
incorporate diaspora communities in 
development programmes. Such integration 
would help not only to utilise the advantages 
that diaspora returnees possess when 
participating in civil society campaigns in the 
homeland, but could also help these returnees 
to overcome potential challenges that they 
face. 
 
The research for the report has relied on 75 
interviews with diaspora returnees to three 
homelands: The Kurdistan Region of Iraq; 
Somaliland; and South Sudan. After 
elaborating on the rationale for this study, the 
report explains in more detail the 
methodology and case-study selection. In the 
following part, the report analyses the findings 
based on these interviews. It concludes with 
policy recommendations. 
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Rationale for the study 
While the majority of these refugees settled in 
camps in neighbouring states, a substantial 
number of them ended up seeking asylum in 
Western Europe, North America and Australia. 
Gradually, these refugees have consolidated into 
diaspora communities in their ‘host countries’.1 
While engaging with their new societies, they 
have also sought to retain their connections with 
their homeland. Initially, this connection between 
the diaspora and the homeland revolved mainly 
around the diaspora’s contribution to the 
economy of their homeland. By sending 
remittances to their relatives that have stayed 
behind, diaspora communities had become not 
only an essential source of support for their 
families but also the backbone for their 
homelands’ economies (Tabar 2014; Newland 
and Patrick 2004). As the diasporans have 
settled in their new homes, they found other 
ways to contribute to their homelands while also 
benefiting from such interaction. Hence, 
diaspora communities began to directly invest in 
business ventures in their homelands, 
sometimes becoming influential businesspeople 
in these countries (Brinkerhoff 2008). 
 
Beyond financially investing in their homelands, 
diasporas have been pointed out to play a crucial 
role in the politics of their homelands. Recently 
escaping violence inflicted upon their 
communities by external actors, members of the 
diaspora began lobbying the cause of their 
homelands in their host countries. Especially 
after acquiring citizenship and the right to vote, 
members of diaspora communities have sought 
to pressure their governments in the West to 
support their homelands’ plight, intervene to 
protect their compatriots from further violence, 
or even accept demands for independence, when 
relevant (Geukjian 2014; Probst 2016; Shain 
                                                   
1 The term host country, frequently used to describe the country in which diaspora 
community reside, is not free of problems. Many of the interviewees for this project 
2002; Baser 2015; Toivanen 2013). But such 
activism has taken place not only within the 
boundaries of the host country. Diaspora 
communities have also functioned as pools of 
manpower for their compatriots in the 
homeland in cases of protracted conflicts. 
Due to their distance from the conflict, 
diaspora communities have often disrupted 
peace efforts, pushing the government in the 
homeland to take more hawkish stands. 
Hence, they have been pointed out as 
potential spoilers of peace agreements (Shain 
and Aryasinha 2006; Van Hear and Cohen 
2017; Hoffman et al. 2007). Other works, 
nevertheless, have stressed the role of 
diasporas as potential peace-brokers and 
bridges between warring parties (Baser and 
Swain 2008; Cohen 2008; Pande 2017). 
 
In more recent years, as the conflicts that 
gave birth to the diaspora communities began 
to give way to post-conflict reconstruction, 
diaspora communities have come to play 
other parts in their homelands’ affairs. As the 
governments in the homelands have started 
diverting their efforts and resources to 
capacity-building and governance, members 
of the diaspora became potential contributors 
to such state-building efforts. Their education 
in the host countries, their material resources, 
and their access to the governments in the 
homelands have turned diaspora activists into 
important contributors to these state-building 
projects. Consequently, diasporans have 
sought, and been asked by their governments, 
to join such efforts through their professional 
experiences. Diaspora returnees are now 
integrated into politics, public administration, 
the health and education sectors, 
infrastructure but also the private sector 
(Mohamoud 2006; Wimmer and Schiller 2002; 
Walls 2009; Stokke 2006; Emanuelsson et al. 
expressed strong affiliation with the so-called host countries, seeing them as 
another homeland. The term host country is used mainly for the sake of brevity. 
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2015). And while diaspora communities have 
continued to support the homeland financially, 
this contribution has shifted to an extent from 
sending remittances to philanthropy, focusing on 
particular fields or areas, but also to foreign 
direct investment and tourism (Newland and 
Patrick 2004). 
 
All of these aspects of diasporas communities’ 
participation in the homeland have gained 
attention by scholars and policymakers. 
However, one aspect of diaspora communities’ 
participation in their homelands’ social and 
political life has been somewhat neglected. And 
this aspect is diaspora communities’ active 
participation in the construction of civil society in 
the homeland. Diaspora communities’ 
experiences in their host countries, their access 
to education and employment, and their 
participation in the politics of the host countries 
have exposed them to ideas about and practices 
and standards of governance, society and 
economy that are different than the ones 
prevailing in their homeland. Closely engaged 
with their homelands and their societies, 
diasporans came to realise the lack of such 
institutions in the homeland. This understanding 
has been especially the case among the younger 
generations, who have spent a substantial part, if 
not all of their lives, in the host country (Alinejad 
2011; Ben-David 2012; Helland 2007). And so, 
diaspora activists have sought to join ongoing 
efforts in the homeland to bring about social and 
political reforms. And they have sought to do so 
in various ways, as part of the budding civil 
society in the homeland, by working for 
international organisations, or through joining 
the civil service and administration. 
 
 
                                                   
2 The term civil society has been discussed in numerous works and reports. 
Nevertheless, a more recent discussion by the World Economic Forum provides a 
more recent, and expansive definition of civil society (Jezard 2018). 
3 For Kaldor, nevertheless, the term global society relates to interaction exclusive to 
the global level. As she summarises the definition, ‘global civil society is a platform 
Thus, we may argue that diaspora 
communities in some cases have 
transformed not only to extensions of their 
homelands abroad but also into transnational 
civil society. Here, the term civil society is 
being used in its broadest sense. It refers to a 
wide range of civil organisations to advocate 
changes, including advocacy groups, labour 
unions, charitable organisations, community 
groups, and religious organisations.2 
Nonetheless, as the methodology section 
elaborates, this research has also taken into 
account unorganised activists, including 
journalists; individuals who have joined 
government offices and public administration 
at all levels; and workers and volunteers for 
international aid organisations. The purpose 
of this inclusive definition of transnational civil 
society is to demonstrate to the greatest 
possible extent the function of diaspora 
communities as transnational conveyers of 
ideas, from the host country to the homeland. 
 
The study builds upon a growing 
understanding of civil society as being 
transnational. Mary Kaldor (2003), for 
instance, had noted that the growing 
connection between like-minded individuals 
and groups in different countries, even before 
the advent of the internet, along with the 
emergence of international human rights 
legislation, created the foundations for a 
global civil society essentially.3 And indeed, 
various works have emphasised the growing 
significance of transnational civil society 
activism in producing change across borders, 
either at the state or at the global levels 
(Chandler 2004; Florini 2012; Price 2003; Keck 
and Sikkink 1998). And though the emergence 
of such transnational activism has not been 
inhabited by activists (or post-Marxists), NGOs and neoliberals, as well as 
national and religious groups, where they argue about, campaign for (or against), 
negotiate about, or lobby for the arrangements that shape global developments’ 
(Kaldor 2003, 590). 
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free of criticism,4 it has still been accepted as an 
engine of change. These studies too, 
nevertheless, fall short of giving sufficient 
attention to the diaspora component of 
transnational civil society activism. 
 
To be sure, some works and reports have 
identified this function of diaspora communities 
in transnational civil society activism. In what 
one of my interviewees described as a pilot 
scheme, the multinational professional services 
network, Deloitte, implementing a project 
designed and funded by the International 
Organisation for Migration (IOM), sought to hire 
members of the South Sudanese diaspora to 
work on capacity-building projects in the 
homeland.5 This project, nonetheless, did not 
fully materialise. Several studies and reports 
commissioned by donor organisations suggest a 
realisation of the potential part diaspora activists 
can have in developmental and civil society 
campaigns (e.g. Boyle and Kitchin 2014; 
Kuschminder 2011; Terrazas 2010). However, 
these works have generally avoided 
conceptualising diaspora activism in broad 
terms. As such, they have left room for further 
exploring the study of diaspora activism and its 
implications. Diaspora should gain special 
attention as part of the study of transnational 
civil society because diaspora activism 
represents the essence of transnational 
activism. Diaspora activists, whether they 
operate mainly in the homeland or the host 
country, are immersed in both societies. Their 
activism is the outcome of their experiences in 
the host country, shaped by their desire to 
develop the homeland. Their status as 
diasporans has privileges. They have access to 
education in a way in which many of their 
compatriots in the homeland have never had; 
                                                   
4 David Chandler (2004), for example, warns that the emergence of global civil society 
is primarily neoliberal and puts to risk the idea of collective action in favour of elite 
advocacy. 
5 According to the interviewee’s account, ‘Deloitte at one time advertised to the 
diaspora opportunities. The people who were recruited and brought to the country as 
they have passports that grant them greater 
freedom of movement, and they have access 
to policymakers in the host country. All of 
these factors turn diaspora activists into 
potentially crucial cohorts in civil society 
campaigns. The successes and failures of 
diasporans to play the role of a transnational 
civil society, therefore, can teach us much 
about the prospects of transnational 
advocacy. 
 
Research Design and Methodology 
i. Research questions 
The exploration of diaspora as a transnational 
civil society entails the following research 
questions. First, what are the motivations for 
members of diaspora communities to try and 
integrate into civil society movements and 
campaigns for reforms in the homeland? 
Understanding these motivations is essential 
for designing strategies for encouraging more 
members of diaspora communities to join 
such networks. The second set of questions 
relates to the way diaspora activists 
themselves perceive and utilise their 
experience in the host country. This 
experience is the basis for the ideas that 
diaspora activists and returnees convey to the 
homeland. But how does this experience 
come to play in the diaspora campaigns? The 
third set of questions is: What advantages 
does the ‘diasporan’ status have for 
participants in transnational advocacy efforts 
and civil society? Does it open more doors? 
Does it enhance diasporans’ participation and 
ability to attract more audiences? The fourth 
major question is: Does seeking to operate as 
diaspora advocates and members of civil 
society have disadvantages? What kind of 
experts in the area of civil affairs, administration and governance. They succeeded 
in bringing the people. But unfortunately, they didn’t win the projects’ (Juba, 20 
February 2019). Two other interviewees in South Sudan testified to working for 
Deloitte in South Sudan, though they didn’t link it to this specific project. 
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difficulties do diasporans face when trying to 
advocate a change, that are different from local 
activists? And what kind of strategies do 
diaspora activists and returnees develop to cope 
with these challenges? 
 
The research has been carried out in three 
cases: The Kurdistan Region in Iraq, Somaliland, 
and South Sudan. These three cases are 
different in many respects. Still, the purpose of 
this investigation is to highlight the 
commonalities between the cases and point out 
the potential for at least broad generalisations 
about diaspora activism. And indeed, the 
research has found notable similarities between 
experiences of diaspora participants in civil 
society in the three cases, which are presented 
later in the report. 
 
ii. Case selection 
The case study selection was based on several 
criteria. The three cases share many similarities, 
which make them crucial cases for the analysis. 
First, the bulk of the diaspora communities in the 
three cases emerged in the 1980s and 1990s. 
The emergence of the diaspora communities 
was the outcome of a mass forced displacement 
due to conflict. This experience of forced 
dislocation has affected the perception and bond 
of these communities with their homeland (King 
2005; 2008; Lewis 2008). It has also increased 
the importance of the refugees’ lobbying efforts 
(Van Bruinessesn 1998; Jhazbhay 2009; Hertzke 
2004; Rolandsen 2005). Similarly, in the three 
cases, the 1990s and early 2000s witnessed the 
decline of conflict, which gave place to state- 
and capacity-building projects. In the case of 
Somaliland and Kurdistan in Iraq, state-building 
has not translated to international sovereignty, 
                                                   
6 There are notable parities between the three different governments in terms of 
economic development. The Kurdistan Region in Iraq has enjoyed a far higher level of 
economic development than Somalia and South Sudan. This level of development has 
had to do primarily with oil income, but also the KRG’s stability, which has enabled 
foreign direct investment. 
as both governments remain unrecognised, 
due to the international community’s refusal 
to acknowledge their de facto independence 
(Voller 2014; Bradbury 2008). Nonetheless, 
this lack of recognition has had only limited 
impact on state-building in these countries. 
Third, with the end of the protracted conflicts, 
members of the diaspora became visible 
elements in state-building projects 
(Emanuelsson et al. 2015; Voller 2014; 
Bradburry 2008; Johnson 2016). This was true 
mainly in the cases of the democratic 
transitions that the Kurdistan Regional 
Government (KRG) and Somaliland have 
experienced (Voller 2015; Abokor et al. 2006). 
Fourth, the three countries in question have 
been the recipients of donations and aid for 
projects relating to civil society development.6 
These have come from DFID, USAID, 
international NGOs and various United 
Nations (UN) agencies, including the UN 
Assistant Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), UN 
Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) and UN Mission 
in South Sudan (UNMISS). 
 
iii. Methodology 
The analysis for the research has relied on 
data gathered through six-month-long 
fieldwork in the three sites, from November 
2018 and until May 2019. The fieldwork 
involved interviews with diasporans based in 
the homelands, or, in a few cases (5 
interviews out of 75), have been involved 
extensively with the homeland but are still 
based in the host country. The governments 
in question do not hold detailed statistical 
data on diaspora returnees. This policy may 
have to do with the fact that the term 
‘returnees’ itself is not free of problems.7 The 
7 As many of the interviewees themselves admitted, they do not necessarily 
see their lives in the homeland as permanent. These interviewees have 
considered the possibility of returning to the host country. Interestingly, in 
Kurdistan, returnees are often termed ‘ex-pats’. In British and American 
contexts, the term ex-pats (derived from expatriates) refers to skilled workers 
migrating overseas (Castree et al. 2013, 144). 
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research involved 25 interviewees in each case. 
The idea behind focusing solely on diaspora 
returnees, and exclude so-called stayees at this 
stage stemmed from the desire to get a 
coherent understanding of how diasporans 
perceive their experiences. A more 
comprehensive picture could be achieved in the 
future by interviewing stayees working with 
returnees, against the statements by the 
returnees (Rock 2017). But to do that, there is 
still a need to theorise about the experiences of 
diaspora returnees. 
 
The initial criterion for choosing interviewees 
was that they must possess citizenship of the 
host country. The setting of the criterion was 
based on several assumptions. First, since the 
term diaspora can be somewhat lucid, being a 
citizen of the host country indicates that the 
interviewee spent a substantial period in the host 
country to become a citizen. Second, being a 
citizen of the host country also gives the person 
a potential influence in the host country, through 
voting rights. A third assumptions has been that 
foreign citizenship creates certain dynamics 
between the returnees and homeland. It may 
provide the returnees with a sense of protection 
by the host country’s government; the ability to 
leave the homeland freely; but it also shapes the 
so-called stayees’ view the returnees, for better 
or for worst (Rock 2017).8 Of the 75 interviewees, 
one exception was made, concerning an 
individual who has recently renounced his 
American citizenship for personal reasons. 
 
The second criterion for choosing interviewees 
was their participation in the social and political 
life in the homeland. The list of participants 
includes NGO workers and volunteers, 
employees of international organisations and aid 
providers, organised and independent advocates 
for specific causes, educators at the higher 
                                                   
8 This has also been identified by Anna Ida Rock (2017) in her study of the diaspora in 
Somaliland. 
education and university levels, journalists, 
artists, civil servants and politicians. 
Concerning the latter categories, while those 
are usually excluded from the definition of 
civil society, diaspora returnees have often 
made the transition from one form of civil 
society activism into government and civil 
service. Moreover, if the purpose of the report 
is to examine the potential role of diaspora 
activists as conveyor belts of ideas, then 
governance and the civil service are certainly 
avenues for achieving this goal. The research 
generally avoided interviewing business 
entrepreneurs, under the assumption that 
such individuals prioritise other factors at the 
expense of norm integration. However, in both 
Somaliland and Kurdistan, two exceptions 
were made, when entrepreneurs maintained 
to have been searching actively to introduce 
new norms of employment and work ethics 
into society through their work. 
 
Interviewers have endeavoured to create a 
body of interviewees of diverse backgrounds 
in terms of gender and age. As for gender, 
whereas in Somaliland and Kurdistan, there 
was a significant representation to both male 
and female interviewees, this proved to be a 
significant challenge in South Sudan. The 
ongoing civil war at the time of the research 
involved multiple cases of sexual violence that 
targeted girls and women primarily. This 
violence has driven many female returnees to 
seek refuge in neighbouring countries, such 
as Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia. Hence, the 
number of female interviewees in South 
Sudan is significantly lower than in other 
cases. And while the research did not seek to 
discriminate based on educational 
background, all interviewees except for one, in 
Somaliland, have academic degrees, ranging 
from bachelor degrees to doctorates. And 
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while the study sought to avoid ageism, the 
majority of interviewees were 45 and younger. 
Four interviewees, nonetheless, were in the 
seventh decade of their lives. 
 
The access to most interviewees was through 
chain-referral (Babbie 1995) or snowball 
sampling (Biernacki and Waldord 1981). Through 
initial connections and interviews, the 
interviewers have been introduced to other 
interviewees that fit the criteria I presented. The 
interviews were based on a structured interview 
questionnaire.9 The questions were open-ended 
and gave the interviewees space to present their 
thoughts and experiences. For considerations 
relating to the ethics of the research, certain 
questions were avoided. For example, I refrained 
from asking direct questions on political 
opposition or criticism of incumbent 
governments. Some interviewees, though, 
initiated such discussions. In fact, generally 
speaking, in the three countries, interviewees 
seemed open to discussing social and political 
challenges, which indicates at least a certain 
degree of openness. 
 
With the data gathered in the interviews, the 
research has aimed to trace the process through 
which diaspora communities have evolved as a 
transnational civil society. In his study, Oisín 
Tansey (2007) stresses the immense potential 
that elite interviews have for process tracing.10 
Tansey (2007, 765), counts several advantages 
that such interviews have for case study 
analysis: They can ‘establish what a set of 
people think’; ‘Make inferences about a larger 
population’s characteristics/ decisions’; and 
‘Reconstruct an event or set of events’. Indeed, 
interviews have been in many previous studies of 
diaspora communities and their link with the 
homeland (Baser 2015; Baser and Swain 2008; 
                                                   
9 The questionnaire is available here. 
10 While Tansey (2007) refers to the term elite interviews chiefly to policymakers and 
government officials, the study views diaspora returnees as broadly fitting into this 
definition. This is due to their educational background, experiences, and aims. 
Toivanen 2013; Rock 2017). The forthcoming 
analysis of the data gathered through the 
interviews presents a detailed picture of the 
experiences, achievements and challenges of 
diaspora returnees. 
 
Analysis 
i. Perception of challenges in the 
homeland 
A good starting point for understanding the 
role of diaspora as a transnational civil society 
is to observe how diaspora returnees view 
their society and the socio-political and 
economic challenges it faces. Education was 
the most recurring issue in the interviews, as 
interviewees pointed out problems in the 
education system as one of the greatest 
challenges to society. Many of the complaints 
have been about the infrastructure and 
facilities. One interviewee in Somaliland, a 
banker who has also volunteered to work with 
government organisations in introducing 
computation, has pointed out the fact that in 
education, as in other sectors, ‘the system still 
relies on paper and blackboards’ (Hargeisa, 10 
December 2018). In fact, one interviewee in 
Somaliland, who has volunteered as a teacher 
in IDP camps, explained that often, these are 
the communities, rather than the government, 
that build schools: ‘Schools are built by the 
civil society,11 by people who keep schools 
open for kids... The government is not even 
involved’ (Hargeisa, 24 January 2019). In 
South Sudan, a county official has stated that 
‘Illiteracy is so high, because the educational 
level is so low, so that when you explain 
something to someone that could benefit 
them in the future, they won’t understand it’ 
(Juba, 6 March 2019). As in Somaliland, the 
11 Here the interviewee used the term ‘civil society’ in the meaning of local 
community. 
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South Sudanese official pointed out that many 
efforts to establish education systems are the 
outcomes of local initiatives (Juba, 26 February 
2019).12 In Kurdistan, a university professor 
maintained that ‘we are lagging behind. We still 
follow the old system, from the Ba‘th days. And 
this applies to all levels of the education system’ 
(Erbil, 17 April 2019).  
 
Not only in education, but also the state of 
general social infrastructure has been brought 
up by interviewees. Interviewees in particular 
mentioned the situation of public health, or the 
lack of it. In Kurdistan, where a thriving private 
health industry is the main provider of health 
services, one interviewee bemoaned that ‘there’s 
no health infrastructure. You cannot rely on 
public hospitals. You have to pay. It’s not like in 
the UK. Even if I come with terminal illness, they 
won’t treat me if I don’t pay upfront’ (Erbil, 16 
April 2019). Another interviewee reiterated that 
‘The sector has been completely privatised, and 
the facilities that are available to the public are 
terrible. Only those who can’t afford to attend 
private facilities go to public hospitals, because 
they don’t have a choice’ (Erbil, 24 April 2019). 
 
Nevertheless, beyond infrastructure and 
education, which are considered as under the 
governments’ direct responsibility, many of the 
returnees have identified social and cultural 
issues as the greatest hinderances to national 
development. Tribalism has been one recurring 
issue, brought up by Many interviewees in 
Somaliland, where clan affiliation is a main 
source of support and access to services and 
resources; and in South Sudan, where 
tribalism/ethnicity (the terms have been used 
interchangeably with references to the same 
groups), has served as a mobilising factor in the 
ongoing civil war. In South Sudan, a researcher 
at one of the very few independent research 
                                                   
12 One testimony for a successful educational endeavour was by a high-ranking 
Episcopal cleric, who was successful in establishing a local university. This, 
institutes in Juba explained that the state has 
been ‘unable to create incentives to bring 
societies together… The state cannot fulfil its 
most basic commitment to the population, 
namely providing them security. So the people 
go back to their zone of safety, to their tribal 
enclaves’ (Juba, 24 May 2019). Another 
returnee, who is working for the South 
Sudanese Ministry of Defence, has lamented 
that the country’s greatest problem is that 
‘there is no unity because of tribalism. 
Everyone believes in their own culture. I never 
encountered such things in America (Juba, 20 
April 2019). In Somaliland, an interviewee 
proclaimed that ‘Asking which clan people are 
from is not normal and I think this is what 
makes us separated in a way and why we are 
divided. I think a lot of diaspora want to 
overcome the tribalism thing’. In fact, she 
went on, ‘the clan leaders want to leave this 
behind, but it is impossible because you 
benefit from it at the same time’ (Hargeisa, 6 
December 2018). Interviewees in Kurdistan, 
on the other hand, made no mentions of tribal 
divides. One interviewee, though, did mention 
ethno-religious divides, stating that ‘Muslims… 
don’t like Yezidis. They won’t maybe say it but 
it’s the fact. They don’t like Christians and 
Christians don’t like Muslims. Yezidis don’t 
like Muslims. They don’t like each other’ 
(Duhok, 24 April 2019). 
 
Another persisting theme in the reflections of 
diaspora returnees about the challenges the 
homeland faces, in the three cases, was that 
of ‘mentality’. Many returnees complained 
about ‘laziness’, lack of commitment and 
apathy on the side of stayees, whether 
government officials, service providers, 
employees, students and the public in general. 
One returnee, who operates a manpower and 
training centres across Kurdistan, maintained 
nonetheless, was with the aid of the church, rather than the local community 
(Juba, 12 May 2019). 
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that ‘working standards, ethics, things like that, 
the quality of work, dedication to work, they are 
still stuck in the past. This is because of lack of 
education, the absence of international 
corporations. The level of work is poor across all 
kinds of jobs’ (Erbil, 11 April 2019). Another Erbil-
based returnee, a journalist and 
environmentalist, complained that in his host 
country, ‘when you go to a bank, they won’t 
necessarily be nice to you. But they provide you 
with a useful service’. In Kurdistan, in contrast, 
when ‘you get to a government building, they 
welcome you, they offer you tea, they are nice to 
you. But they don’t do the work they should be 
doing’ (Erbil, 14 April 2019). In South Sudan, a 
returnee working for a UN agency stated that ‘If I 
bring a cleaner from the US, he could teach 
cleaners here about work ethics and dedication 
to work. I’ve seen people who work in office. 
They come to the office and do nothing at all. A 
person from the diaspora will not accept this’ 
(Juba, 21 February 2019). 
 
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the word 
‘democracy’ has been hardly mentioned explicitly 
by the interviewees. However, this does not 
mean that interviewees did not reflect on 
governance. Rather than democracy, references 
have been made to such terms as transparency 
and accountability. One South Sudanese 
demographer noted that ‘some of our 
policymaker can barely read. Our environment is 
politically charged. And there is no much 
accountability. If there’s no accountability, if you 
are not held for certain standards, even if you are 
capable, you can slack’ (Juba, 29 April 2019). 
Another youth worker in Juba noted that ‘South 
Sudanese in the West… need assistance on 
similar issues as people in South Sudan. The 
only difference is that in these cases, there are 
already institutions in place. In South Sudan, 
unlike the US, Canada or Australia, if something 
happens, nobody is held accountable’ (Juba, 29 
April 2019). 
Concerns for gender equality and gendered 
violence were brought up frequently, though 
somewhat dispiritingly mostly by women 
interviewees. A South Sudanese activist, 
working for an NGO working to advance 
women’s education, stressed that: 
 
Because of our patriarchal system, women 
are not viewed as equals. They are not given 
opportunities in all aspects. From childhood, 
girls are viewed as property… Because of the 
lack of education, they cannot make 
decisions about their own future. Without 
access to education, and often without 
access to health, women don’t know their 
rights (Juba, 19 March 2019). 
Another Juba-based analyst pointed out that 
‘women are not equal to men. There’s 
tokenism, and women in politics are mostly 
tokens. At home, the division of labour is 
unequal, and women face great burden for 
women’ (Juba, 21 March 2019). In 
Somaliland, an activist promoting women’s 
participation in politics and the economy told 
of her experience since her return from 
Western Europe: ‘When I came here, I realized 
we have equality. It was shocking to see 
women absent at management levels. If I go 
to high level meetings, I am the only woman in 
there. How come? I’m sure we have qualified 
women’ (Hargeisa, 31 December 2018). 
 
Another surprising finding from the interviews 
was that most interviewees, even in South 
Sudan and Somaliland, where such issues 
exist, did not mention food and water 
insecurity. In Somaliland, only three 
interviewees mentioned food and water 
deprivation as an issue. One of the 
interviewees stated that ‘water is one of the 
biggest challenges because our country 
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depends on livestock and livestock needs it so it 
is important for our society’ (Hargeisa, 31 
January 2019). In South Sudan, only three 
interviewees mentioned food insecurity and 
water. One, a food insecurity officer at a Western 
European embassy in Juba, specified that ‘60 
percent of the population is food insecure’ (Juba, 
4 May 2019). This discrepancy may reflect the 
fact that many diaspora returnees, at least those 
involved with advocacy and activism, tend to 
concentrate in urban centres, rather than the 
rural areas. 
 
ii. Diaspora returnees’ and socio-political 
changes 
Diaspora returnees have been involved in various 
ways in networks seeking to improve the welfare 
and lives of their homeland. Interestingly enough, 
however, diaspora activists and agents have 
often focused on two dimensions: Aid and 
capacity-building. Few of the interviewees were 
involved in politics, policymaking, or even direct 
campaigning and advocacy, or what can be 
described as naming-and-shaming advocacy 
(Hafner-Burton 2008; Murdie and Peksen 2015). 
In South Sudan, one interviewee has been a 
leading member of an opposition party. Another 
worked for a short-time as a state minister. And 
another has served as an appointed 
commissioner in one of the states comprising 
the former Western Equatoria region. Three 
others have worked as civil servants. In 
Somaliland and Kurdistan too, only two 
interviewees have worked as government 
officials. To be clear, a number interviewees did 
participate in direct advocacy campaigns. In 
Somaliland, one interviewed informed that ‘I 
participated in some campaigns to pressure the 
government or change policies or implement 
new ones. My recent participation was with the 
Somaliland Women’s Movement event, and it 
was about women are not represented in politics 
and felt their wishes are ignored or their voice 
was not heard’ (Hargeisa, 12 January 2019). 
Another told of being able to set up a body for 
citizens to submits complaints to about civil 
affairs (Hargeisa, 20 January 2019). In 
Kurdistan, one interviewee had been directly 
involved in drafting legislation against human 
trafficking, which was passed by the 
parliament (Erbil, 24 April 2019). But these 
represented a minority of the interviewees. As 
one South Sudanese interviewee described 
this reality: ‘We are not really doing direct 
activism. We are trying to feed into activists 
the information. People have been able to 
utilise the information that we have used’ 
(Juba, 24 May 2019). 
 
On the other hand, capacity-building and 
training have concerned a variety of causes 
and fields. These have ranged from political 
and economic reforms, women’s rights 
(again, mostly by women interviewees), food 
and water security, and social welfare. Of the 
three cases, Kurdistan was the only case in 
which a number of interviewees, four to be 
precise have worked on issues relating to 
environmentalism. Social welfare has also 
related to capacity-building among the 
security forces, especially in their treatment of 
more vulnerable groups in society. In 
Somaliland, one interviewee has worked for a 
UN agency along with the local Ministry of 
Justice to improve the conditions for inmates. 
Her work, according to her description, has 
involved supervising the implementation of 
regulation by the warden and prison guards, 
but also communicating directly with 
prisoners and check on their educational and 
health needs, and generally ‘Making sure that 
human rights aren’t violated in the prisons’. 
Having her educational background in legal 
studies, she moved to deal with prisoners’ 
rights after advocating the abolition of female 
genital mutilation (FGM) (Hargeisa, 3 
December 2018). 
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In South Sudan as well, one interviewee worked 
in training and capacity-building of law 
enforcement agents and judges, before moving 
to an administrative position at the UN agency 
that employs him. He has landed in this position 
after having gained experience in the US army in 
Iraq, where he trained Iraqi policemen and law 
enforcement agents about civil rights and due 
processes, followed by employment as a parole 
officer in US. His task involved: 
 
Overseeing the capacity building of law 
enforcement agents and judges, monitor 
human rights in South Sudan by advising the 
relevant authorities against arbitrary arrests 
and prolonged detention among others. As part 
of my work, I mostly interacted with the 
government officials by giving them advices 
and trainings of the law enforcement agents 
and judges. My typical work was trying to build 
the capacity of police, so that they can avoid 
certain interrogation techniques. 
He also tried to advance the building of juvenile 
centres and halfway houses in South Sudan, 
though without success (Juba, 21 February 
2019). 
 
In Kurdistan too, one interviewee has been 
responsible for carrying capacity-building 
workshops for policy officers on how to deal 
with gendered violence, as part of her work for 
an NGO dedicated to improving women’s rights. 
One topic she advanced in particular has been 
that of human trafficking into Kurdistan, 
especially of young women to work as maids 
and nannies for the growing middle class, and 
who have been subjected to abuse and violation 
                                                   
13 This statement was echoed by an interviewee in the city of Sulaymaniyah (the cited 
interview took place in Dohuk), who noted that ‘The freedom I used to have in UK I still 
have it here. It's a very liberal city, I mean Sulaymaniyah. Yes, you have it but it's 
limited’ (Sulaymaniyah, 2 May 2019). 
of employee and civil rights.  Her work on this 
topic, she noted, was motivated by her own 
experiences in the US, where she has lived 
since her childhood: ‘Coming from the US, I 
found it unacceptable the way women are 
treated, for example in the family. Or the fact 
that male employees will refuse to accept the 
authority of a female boss’ (Erbil, 24 April 
2019). At the time of the interviews, the 
Kurdistan region was still recovering from the 
episode of the Islamic State. Many Yezidi 
victims of the IS’s genocidal campaign were 
still residing in IDP camps across the region. 
Several of the interviewees who have dealt 
with issues relating to gender rights focused 
their efforts on Yezidi women who had been 
freed from IS captivity. One interviewee was 
volunteering at the time of the interview with 
an NGO that aided Yezidi women at the 
camps. Working for the organisation’s gender 
department, she was meeting on a weekly 
basis with Yezidi IDPs, asking them about 
their conditions, problems and addressing the 
feeling of neglect that they were experiencing 
in the camps. Returning to Kurdistan from a 
Scandinavian country, where she spent all of 
the life, the interviewee linked this work with 
her experience as a woman in Kurdistan, in 
comparison to the host country: ‘It’s so 
different, I feel more imprisoned here. I feel I 
don’t have the same freedoms. I see 
unfairness going on a daily basis. You just 
become more aware of it. It is good to see the 
experiences of both societies’ (Sulaymaniyah, 
23 April 2019).13 These are of course only a 
few anecdotal examples. But they tell of 
returnees’ participation and contribution to 
fields that rarely get any attention in societies 
whose members are often preoccupied with 
daily survival.14 
14 Of course, capacity-building is not completely devoid of direct advocacy. As one 
South Sudanese employed in a senior position by a major international NGOs 
described his work: ‘Capacity-building refers to formulating documents to be used 
by council of minister handbook for the Jonglei state, the executive council 
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Direct advocacy was mostly done not among 
policymakers, but the public, in the form of 
awareness raising in relation to socio-political 
and economic issues. One activist in Somaliland, 
working for an NGO dedicated to countering 
violence against women, and especially FGM, 
described her work as 
 
[encouraging] people to becoming educated 
and aware of the things that affect them 
negatively. So we do a lot of work in advocating 
these issues. We tackle very sensitive issues 
and we found that working in partnership with 
other organisations and governments, and 
engaging in communities in open ways, people 
are open to education, and many of them have 
changed their positions on the things we are 
working on (Hargeisa, 20 December 2018). 
And in other cases, advocacy that was initially 
aimed at the local population, also attracted 
policymakers. As one environmental activist in 
Kurdistan described it: 
 
As the Kurdistan coordinator [of the global 
network of environmentalists he has been 
affiliated with], I’m trying to bring everybody 
together, all these environmentalists from Suli, 
Erbil, Duhok, Halabja, Dukan, Germiyan, all 
doing different activities in different locations to 
raise awareness and to put pressure on the 
government. We do a lot of advocacy training, 
we do a lot of training on solidarity, on how we 
actually come together and share experiences. 
We made these guys to listen to us to put more 
pressure on them [politicians] (Sulaymaniyah, 
                                                   
handbook that would guide the functionalities of the counties, and provision of 
workshops on human resources, training, concept notes, committee to review the 
30 April 2019). 
Following his work on the topic, the activist 
had the opportunity to meet with the KRG’s 
Minister of Environment. In this meeting, he 
lobbied for the drafting of an environmental 
protection law, which would later be passed 
by the parliament. 
 
There are several possible explanations to 
this preference of many returnees to focus on 
the backstage of advocacy networks. One 
explanation may relate to the fact that in the 
societies under investigation, civil society 
activism in general does not focus much on 
advocacy. One South Sudanese interviewee 
commented that, with the exception of NGOs 
affiliated with the church, 
 
The rest of the civil society tend to be 
service-oriented. Because of the limited 
space for civil society, they tend to shy away 
from advocacy. They prefer to provide 
services such as health, education. Many 
civil society organisations provide 
humanitarian aid. But very few engage in 
advocacy, pushing for peace, being voice for 
the people – apart from the church’ (Juba, 2 
May 2019). 
In contrast to these NGOs, the large Christian 
international NGOs he has worked for, has 
striven to ‘work with the government and 
remind them their international obligation in 
terms of the treaties that they have signed… 
to create space and to ensure that there is 
active participation of civil society coupled 
with the investment that have gone into 
developing of local civil organisations’ (ibid). 
 
Jonglei workforce, and concepts that were to be implemented before the crisis 
[2013 civil war] started’ (Juba, 6 March 2019). 
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Another explanation is that often diaspora 
returnees, though seeing themselves as internal 
part of the society in the homeland, still lack 
access to, or understanding of, the local 
networks and actors in play, which can give them 
direct access to policymakers. In other cases, it 
could be the inability, or reluctance, of returnees 
to comply with the local practices. Although 
considering themselves as locals, ‘Sometimes 
this exposure [to Western political culture and 
practices] makes you speak louder than the rest. 
And then people within the system may be 
offended’, as one South Sudanese interviewee 
put it (Juba, 6 March 2019). An interviewee in 
Somaliland observed that there are ‘local people 
[i.e. stayees] who understand the local context in 
a way that is better than diasporas’ (Hargeisa, 20 
December 2018). And another interviewee in 
Somaliland suggested that ‘people here have the 
advantage, because they know each other and 
know better how to make the change; I think we 
should involve the locals and you have to make 
them want the change and make them realize 
that change is good’ (Hargeisa, 4 December 
2018). 
 
Another explanation for this tendency among 
diaspora returnees to focus on capacity-building 
is the expectation on the side of stayees, due to 
their enthusiasm to learn from the experience of 
returnees. One returnee in Somaliland, working 
for a government department, told that she is 
constantly asked to provide training to her co-
workers: ‘they do that all the time especially the 
young generation. They are excited about the 
diaspora and they are like, show us this and 
teach us, so they do that most of the time’. 
Elaborating on that, she informed that: 
 
I do trainings for my co-worker and it’s not my 
job, but I do it because I like it and they like it 
too. What I do is capacity building. I teach them 
teamwork skills… When we went to university 
[in Europe], we had projects we worked on as 
team, so you learn that in the university. But 
here it is different… So I started giving 
trainings on teamwork and communication 
and having the same goals (Hargeisa, 5 
December 2018). 
In Kurdistan, a student and a volunteer with 
youth noted that ‘other students show respect 
to me because I’ve lived in Germany. You 
could see that in discussions we have in 
class. When I shared my ideas based on what 
I’ve seen in Germany, they listened to what I 
had to say’ (Erbil, 26 April 2019).  
 
Nonetheless, in a few cases at least, the 
tendency among diaspora returnees to avoid 
direct engagement with policymakers 
stemmed from what is one of the major 
disadvantages of returning to the homeland, 
which I discuss in more detail below: The 
suspicion and hostility on the side of the 
stayees. One interviewee in Somaliland told 
that ‘I don’t think people respect me because 
they would call me “Arab,” which means “you 
are clueless.” So I would only speak about my 
opinion with my colleagues and I avoid any 
discussion about politics because I feel I don’t 
know much about it’ (Hargeisa, 3 December 
2018). Another bemoaned that ‘when I talk 
about FGM with people, some of them 
challenge me and say to me that I’m too 
western and that I have different views and 
that people here share their opinion [on FGM]’ 
(Hargeisa, 4 December 2018). In South Sudan, 
an interviewee working for a UN agency that 
deals with food insecurity admitted that 
‘Because I feel that I will be judged, I 
sometimes hesitate to express my thoughts. 
And I do, people sometimes tell me “oh, you 
are so Westernised.” I get shot off so many 
topics, and that makes me hesitant about 
raising concerns’ (Juba, 18 May 2019). 
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Another South Sudanese interviewee angrily 
commented that ‘Diasporas are not given 
chance to participate in the government that 
would bring about a change. So the activism 
becomes useless since it is not taken into 
implementation’ (Juba, 20 February 2019). A 
professor at one of the leading universities in 
Erbil has mentioned incident, in which ‘At the 
beginning I had some issues. I may have said 
things that upset people here. I had students 
who were more religious and objected to what I 
had to say about science. I tried to tell them “we 
are talking about science” and have a debate’ 
(Erbil, 17 April 2019). 
 
iii. Reasons for returning 
In light of the nature of activism, it is interesting 
to explore the reasons for returnees to join civil 
society networks in their different ways. When 
initiating the exploration of diaspora participation 
in such networks, and the reason for return in 
general, interlocutors familiar with the 
economies in the countries under investigation 
commented that working for NGOs and 
international organisations is usually a lucrative 
employment opportunity.15 Two interviewee 
bolstered this notion. One interviewee in 
Kurdistan stated that ‘We barely have any 
opportunities to work. With all those refugees 
and IDPs coming into Kurdistan, more 
organisations came to Kurdistan. These are the 
only job we can get. Other than these 
organisations… we have to wait until the 
government gets you a job’ (Duhok, 22 April 
2019). 
 
Nonetheless, those interviewees who described 
their work or activism as an opportunity were a 
small minority. For most interviewees, their 
return to the homeland was motivated by the 
desire to bring to a change, contribute to their 
society, and give back to the homeland after they 
                                                   
15 This assertion echoes observations made by De Waal (2015) and Goodhand (2013). 
have had the privilege of prospering and 
studying in the West. For some, it was their 
personal experiences during past visits to the 
homeland that made them take the decision 
the return. One South Sudanese returnee 
talked about his encounter with soldiers in his 
hometown, in which he was mistreated and 
harassed by them for simply taking a photo of 
the terrain, that made him decide to leave his 
job in the US and apply for a position with a 
UN agency in the country: ‘I was motivated by 
the poor justice system, human rights 
violations I witnessed in South Sudan mostly 
by government agents whenever I pay a visit 
and I decided to come and utilise my 
experience here’ (Juba, 21 February 2019). 
For others, studying at university issues 
relating to development and poverty 
alleviation served as their main drivers. 
Another interviewee in South Sudan told that, 
after graduation, he felt that ‘the need is so 
great, the need to bring about change, 
improve people’s lives, and to put my 
knowledge and skills to better use’. 
Considering his options, he concluded that ‘I 
could not find any country better than my 
country to do this, to me these are the main 
driving forces and also is one way to give 
back to my community the knowledge and 
skills that I have gained’ (Juba, 2 May 2019). 
Another interviewee, when telling of local 
volunteers at a youth centre that he had 
established, told that ‘they don’t know that 
what they are doing is volunteering because, 
they don’t have the concept of voluntary work. 
I do have, and this the result of living in 
Europe’ (Hargeisa, 16 December 2018). 
 
For some, to be sure, the choice to integrate 
into political and social activism was 
intertwined with the desire to return to the 
homeland and explore their roots. An 
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interviewee in Somaliland told of her decision to 
return: ‘I wanted to come back and get to know 
my roots. I left Somaliland when I was 4, so I 
wanted to see my people. I came with my kids 
for them to have a positive experience’. But what 
was supposed to be a short vacation turned into 
a long-term residence. She then joined a local 
NGO working on issues relating to reproductive 
health, and especially the issue of FGM 
(Hargeisa, 4 December 2018). Similarly, another 
Somalilander interviewee explained that ‘I felt 
overworked and I have three kids, so I took a 
year off and moved here. And my other main 
reason was that I wanted my kids to learn about 
the culture and learn the language so I ended up 
staying’. In Hargeisa, she became involved with 
charity organisations, before taking a full-time 
position working for a communication 
corporation (Hargeisa, 3 December 2018). 
However, even in these cases, the interviewees 
had a background of activism in their host 
countries. The former interviewee worked with 
Somali asylum-seekers, whilst the latter was a 
columnist for a liberal newspaper, where she 
dealt with socio-political issues, and especially 
immigrant communities. 
 
And indeed, many of the interviewees, though by 
no means all, had a background of activism, 
volunteering or professional experience in 
advocacy in the homeland. One of the Kurdistan-
based environmentalists interviewed for the 
project informed that before returning to 
Kurdistan, ‘I was an environmentalist… [working 
on] different topics, such as climate change, 
global warming. I always worked with left-wing 
activists… For me it was a right opportunity to 
learn how I can find my track. Eventually I did. I 
was part of that movement’ (Sulaymaniyah, 30 
April 2019). Another Kurdish interviewee, working 
in one of the handful of organisations supporting 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender 
                                                   
16 Such trainings, though, have been mainly conveyed under the title of gender-based 
violence, due to the sensitivity of the subject in Kurdistan. 
individuals in the Kurdistan Region, had 
developed extensive experience in working 
with LGBT asylum-seekers in her host 
country, an experience that ended up serving 
her in her own work with LGBT under threat in 
Kurdistan (Sulaymaniyah, 2 May 2019).16  
 
In several cases, the activism was not 
necessarily on socio-political issues. Some of 
the interviewees were involved in 
campaigning for the cause of the homeland. 
As another Kurdish activist put it, whereas 
now he has been travelling among universities 
and academic institutions in Kurdistan, telling 
them about the practices of other countries in 
fighting climate changes in his host country, 
‘one of my jobs was to go to universities and 
schools and tell them about Iraq, Kurdistan, 
and the Middle East. So I did the opposite 
thing, I educated them about the situation 
here’ (Erbil, 14 April 2019). 
 
These interviewees rebuffed the notion that 
they chose their path simply for making a 
living, when confronted with that question. A 
South Sudanese interviewee responded to 
such assertion that ‘Obviously I need to 
maintain myself. But I am not motivated by 
any financial gains. I do what I do because I 
enjoy doing that. There are better ways to 
make more money. But it’s a way to do 
something and contribute to my society’. 
Reflecting on her decision to return to South 
Sudan, she noted that ‘It was a natural 
transition for me. It’s a new country, and 
there’s a lot that needs to be addressed, 
especially in terms of human rights. We have 
a long way to go, and being involved in civil 
society seemed to be a natural transition’ 
(Juba, 21 March 2019). Another South 
Sudanese interviewee stressed that ‘Financial 
considerations played a very little part in my 
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decision. I wanted to come home to help my 
people. The pay that I get, it’s peanuts. But the 
joy of serving other people at the end of the day, 
that’s what I need’ (Juba, 18 May 2019). In 
another example, an interviewee in Somaliland 
proclaimed that ‘I do have a Dutch passport but 
I’m from here and my identity will be always 
Somali. So I wanted to do what I can for this 
country, because we are behind other countries.  
Also, to be honest, I came here looking for the 
sense of belonging’ (Hargeisa, 13 December 
2018). 
 
This emphasis on the altruistic nature of their 
participation in the social and political life of the 
homeland has aimed to distinguish them from 
those members of the diaspora who have 
sought to exploit the homeland. Several 
interviewees, in all three cases, mentioned those 
migrants who had failed in the host country, but 
returned to the homeland and integrated in 
senior positions in the government and civil 
service. An interviewee in Somaliland, for 
instance, mentioned that ‘the generation before 
us, maybe I shouldn’t say this, but they are 
uneducated old people who became ministers’. 
In contrast, the new generation of returnees are 
‘much more educated people, who want to 
understand the culture, who want to understand 
the country. They are not enough yet, but when 
those people connect to the locals, they could 
improve things’ (Hargeisa, 9 January 2019). And 
another added that ‘I know of at least 10 
diaspora [returnees] who were welfare takers in 
Norway but now they are either DG [director 
generals] or minister etc.’ (Hargeisa, 4 December 
2018). A Kurdish interviewee echoed this notion: 
 
A lot of returnees came back with the wrong 
intention. They came back with this idea of the 
milking cow. They were trying to milk it. And 
most of them, with all due respect, came back 
with huge failures in the Western world. They 
came in and tried to cash in on the 
experiences they had in the outside world. 
They did end up doing very well for 
themselves, but they haven’t done good for 
this place (Erbil, 14 April 2019). 
In short, the desire to bring to changes in the 
homeland threads along many of the cases of 
those involved. But even if not disconnected 
from the need, or the desire, to make financial 
gains, the participation of diaspora returnees 
in the advocacy networks, in different 
capacities, still provided them with the 
opportunity to convey their ideas, which have 
been moulded by their long experiences in the 
West. The next question, then, is in what ways 
has the status of diaspora returnees affected 
their endeavours to have a say and shape 
politics and society. 
 
iv. Diaspora returnees: advantages vs. 
disadvantages 
At the basis of this investigation stood the 
idea that returning from the diaspora into the 
homeland can have a symbolic and real value 
for these returnees when they engage in their 
work and activism. And indeed, most of the 
interviewees concluded that coming from the 
diaspora had certain advantages for 
themselves and for their desire to secure 
change. However, and this notion was shared 
by the vast majority of interviewees, the 
greatest advantage in returning from the 
diaspora lied in their experiences and 
evolution as human beings. Most 
interviewees maintained that living in Western 
Europe, North America and Australia made 
them more proactive, open-minded, capable 
of adjusting to changes, and better equipped 
to embrace and apply available solutions to 
the problems that their societies face, in 
comparison to stayees. A South Sudanese 
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interviewee affirmed that ‘Life in the UK has 
made me realise that it is possible to have views 
that are different, but still respect others’ 
opinions. This might not have been the case had 
I stayed in South Sudan, because of the 
restrictive environment’. Because of that, she 
continued, ‘I am much more equipped to be 
involved. Travelling and living in other cultures, 
having more experiences and even learning new 
languages opens your horizons and mind. It 
makes you a better person, a better judge of 
issues and characters’. Especially as a woman, ‘I 
am freer than my female relatives who have 
never left the country. They are more 
constrained, not as outspoken as I am. They are 
more concerned about what people would think 
of them than I would’ (Juba, 19 March 2019). An 
interviewee in Somaliland, who has worked as an 
aid worker for various international 
organisations, informed that 
 
My experience in growing up and living abroad, 
and being a minority, my particular learning 
experience and access to broad educational 
opportunities, and being able to travel across 
the world, in a small capacity, these are 
advantageous to an aid worker. Those things 
inform my world view and who I am as a 
person (Hargeisa, 27 December 2018). 
And another said that ‘I think humans, in general, 
if they stay in the same place for so long, they 
become close-minded because they don’t see 
new things or changes so this gives me the 
privilege of appreciation and seeing things 
differently… They see a lot more barriers than I 
can see’ (Hargeisa, 4 December 2018). And in 
Kurdistan, an interviewee working as policy 
advisor to the government explained that ‘Living 
in the UK broadened my knowledge, guided me. 
It turned me into who I am now. I am a different 
person… I experienced different education, and 
lived in different countries in Europe. I think 
wiser, I think broader, I am more 
knowledgeable’ (Erbil, 15 April 2019). This 
mobility, thanks to the possession of Western 
passports, continues to serve the returnees in 
the homeland, which gives them further 
advantage over their local colleagues. 
 
Of course, this knowledge and experience has 
more tangible meaning for these returnees, 
especially in terms of skills. As one 
interviewee in Kurdistan narrated, ‘We were 
from the mountains, you know. I was 15 at 
high school when they came to arrest me and 
luckily, I managed to get to the UK. But I came 
to the UK with no skills, other than being able 
to dismantle and reassemble an AK-47 
blindfolded’ (Erbil, 14 April 2019). Having done 
his undergraduate and postgraduate studies 
in the UK, he was able to return to Kurdistan 
and integrate into local government. Another 
interviewee, an artist, city planner and teacher, 
who is advancing urban reforms in the city of 
Sulaymaniyah, reflected that his experience in 
Germany taught him ‘Knowhow management. 
It’s about how can I think. The structure of 
thinking was very wrong here. They give you a 
better discipline to think… One thing I learnt in 
Germany is to focus on small things, to think 
in small ways’ (Sulaymaniyah, 27 April 2019). 
For an interviewee in Somaliland, it was her 
opportunity to work on such a controversial 
topic (certainly in the context of Somaliland) 
as FGM in the Netherlands that gave her the 
tools to continue working on the topic in her 
homeland: ‘Having the background of FGM is 
something that gave me the access to 
participate in policy making and I wasn’t 
intimidated to take part because I have the 
prior knowledge and experience. If I didn’t 
know about FGM, I wouldn’t want to tackle it I 
guess’ (Hargeisa, 3 December 2018). In a 
similar fashion, a South Sudanese 
interviewee, working as a researcher for a UK-
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funded research institute, confided that ‘Coming 
from the UK has provided me with the necessary 
professional skills. I’ve worked with big and small 
organisations, and this has provided me with 
skills that maybe I wouldn’t have had I remained 
in South Sudan’ (Juba, 21 March 2019). Such 
experiences have also made returnees, at least 
according to their self-perception, more prone to 
volunteer and seek way to contribute to society, 
in comparison to stayees. As one interviewee 
complained, ‘I need to contribute to society. We 
had a bit of patriotism in reality. But for people 
here, it’s more about how can I fill my pockets, 
not what can I do for the country’ (Hargeisa, 27 
December 2018). 
 
One advantage highlighted by a number of 
interviewees is the ability of diaspora returnees 
to serve as a bridge between the local 
community and governance and international 
actors, such as international organisations and 
other governments. For some interviewees, their 
experiences of living and studying in the West 
has given them access to foreign organisations 
and organisations that are present in the 
homeland. An interviewee in South Sudan, who 
has worked as a county official, described that 
‘NGOs like to interact with me. When they come 
to the office, I know exactly what they expect’ 
(Juba, 22 February 2019). According to another 
South Sudanese interviewee, ‘I have access to 
resources that people who live here don’t have. I 
can address the American ambassador if I need; 
I can communicate with other Western scholars 
to consult with them about developing my ideas. 
I am privileged in this respect’ (Juba, 29 April 
2019). And a third interviewee noted that ‘[NGOs 
and Western expatriates in South Sudan] give me 
respect, because I come from their countries. So 
they look at you as someone who makes a 
difference. They won’t dismiss what have you to 
say... People are more receptive to what I have to 
say and my ideas (Juba, 22 March 2019). 
But for others, this bridging has taken the 
opposite direction, from NGOs and aid 
organisations to the local society. Several of 
the interviewees suggested that, being both 
local but also Western in their orientation and 
thinking, they could address the problems of 
the grassroots better than foreigners may. 
Several interviewees working for international 
organisations and NGOs told of private 
initiatives in which they, together with other 
locals and members of the diaspora, have 
delivered food and other aid to those in need. 
Their knowledge of the language and culture, 
but also family networks, have helped in 
identifying those in need and approach them 
directly. When detailing his engagement with 
the local population in South Sudan, one 
interviewee pointed out that ‘We lived and 
experienced values like human rights. But we 
were also born here, and we understand 
South Sudanese values, which other people 
couldn’t understand and may take at face 
value. When we debate with people here, we 
are well-informed especially when we debate 
with the government’ (Juba, 24 May 2019). 
Another suggested that ‘If you work in South 
Sudan, you need to really know the country 
and society. You need to be culturally 
sensitive’ (Juba, 20 February 2019). A 
Somalilander interviewee discussed her 
experience of establishing a charitable 
network to support orphans and families in 
need, providing a fine example for how 
diaspora returnees can use their local 
networks: 
 
We used our own mechanism like social 
network, where we spoke with our 
neighbours in different areas... A lot of areas 
have Miskiin Kalkaal, like social support for 
poor people through mosques, where they 
collect money or food and then give it away 
to people in need.  Through that, we got a lot 
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of people and spoke to a lot of shopkeepers 
because we did not want to have big criteria. 
For example, [the international NGO she works 
for] uses the village counsels and leaders as 
gatekeepers, who are put in a position of power 
and sometimes exploit this [to benefit their 
family members]… We figured out that since we 
have the local network, we know Somali and we 
know these people, we know local mosques, 
why don’t we just do it ourselves? (Hargeisa, 3 
December 2018). 
This point about the diaspora returnees’ role as a 
potential bridge inside the homeland directly 
relates to their potential role, at least as they 
perceive it, as bridges between the homeland 
and their host country. The interviewees 
frequently stressed that returning to the 
homeland does not mean turning their backs to 
their new homes. Many of them stated that they 
visit their host countries at least on an annual 
basis, and keep in touch with family and friends 
there. As one Kurdish interviewee put it, ‘I love 
Kurdistan. This is my home. It doesn’t mean that 
I don’t love Germany. I love Germany the same 
way. I have two nationalities and two homes. But 
even when I’m in Germany, there’s something 
that makes me want to come back here’ (Erbil, 
26 April 2019). A Somalilander interviewee 
reiterated this notion, declaring that ‘People tell 
me, you don’t have a home. But it’s not true, I 
have two homes. I’m comfortable here, and what 
you do here means something’ (Hargeisa, 6 
December 2018). 
 
In one area, however, opinions among 
interviewees were more varied, and that related 
to the symbolic value of the returnee status, and 
whether returning from the diaspora has gained 
a person more credibility among listeners. For 
some interviewees, returning from the diaspora 
has given them some advantages among 
listeners. One interviewee in Somaliland 
observed that ‘There is an assumption that 
you know a lot more than the people here 
know... where I work, you can have somebody 
with a Master’s degree or PhD, who works for 
the ministry and [who was] born and raised in 
here, but somehow my opinion is more 
convincing’ (Hargeisa, 29 January 2019). In 
South Sudan, an interviewee emphasised that 
 
People in South Sudan think whoever came 
from the US knows everything and your 
ideas in the community is highly needed. 
Coming from abroad has been helpful to my 
activism because when I came people 
treated me differently so good as part of 
them and sometime when you come from 
the west the local people thinks you’re highly 
educated and they are willing to listen to you’ 
(Juba, 11 March 2019). 
And in Kurdistan, a university professor and a 
columnist argued that ‘I do feel that people 
listen to me more, because of my 
experiences. My students, my family, even my 
friends. Even my readers give me more 
credibility, because they say “she lived abroad, 
she brings in her experiences.” Sometimes 
they ask me to talk about my experiences’ 
(Erbil, 16 April 2019). 
 
Others, nevertheless, have been more 
cautious about this position. One interviewee 
in Kurdistan warned that ‘It used to be enough 
to come back with a European travel 
document to be appointed for a position, 
straight away. Not anymore’. Considering his 
own experiences, he asserted that ‘If I say it’s 
not been a factor, I won’t be completely 
honest. But it hasn’t given me too much 
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advantage. When someone introduces you to 
someone else, and they say “this guy is a 
graduate of a British university,” they will take 
note – until you open your mouth’ (Erbil, 14 April 
2019). Especially with regard to approaching 
local policymakers and officials, some of the 
interviewees were more sceptic, even frustrated. 
A South Sudanese researcher bemoaned that 
‘Honestly, only a few of our recommendations 
are getting implemented. But this is an issue of 
capacity, it’s not that they are not interested. But 
some of our policymaker can barely read’ (Juba, 
29 April 2019). An interviewee in Kurdistan noted 
that ‘It’s too hard to change policymaking. That 
was my first goal when I came back, to be in a 
position of influence, in politics, even in the 
government, telling them these things are not 
right. But it’s too hard’ (Erbil, 24 April 2019). And 
another interviewee in Kurdistan, an academic 
who focuses on environmental issues explained: 
‘If you really want to make a change in this part 
of the world, it is not through legislation and 
passing laws, you need to raise the awareness of 
people. If people are educated and informed, 
they will realise that there’s a problem that needs 
to be solved’ (Erbil, 17 April 2019).  
 
Overall, then, coming from the diaspora has 
carried not insignificant advantages for the 
returnees in their efforts to integrate into existing 
civil society networks and convey their idea and 
share their experience. Yet, returning from the 
diaspora also has disadvantages, which are also 
relevant for understanding diaspora as a 
transnational civil society. One of these 
challenges has been the ability to adjust to the 
lives of the homeland after living outside for so 
many years. Many of the interviewees reported 
on other diaspora returnees, coming to the 
homeland with the aim of contributing to its 
development and economy, who left back to 
their host countries after they had been unable 
to adjust to life in the homeland. A South 
Sudanese interviewee acknowledged that ‘It’s 
not an easy move... You have to adapt to the 
way things are going here. You don’t have 
stability that you have in Australia. There’s 
work, if you are sick you go to the hospital. 
You don’t have these things here. And it takes 
its toll on you (Juba, 4 May 2019)’. An 
interviewee in Somaliland remarked that ‘I 
have seen it with a lot of my friends. They 
come here, but they see the corruption, they 
see the negative things. And they think, “why 
should I stay here, when I can stay in the UK 
or Holland, make 4-5,000 dollars a month and 
live good lives’ (Hargeisa, 9 December 2018). 
And a Kurdish returnee, an academic and 
economist, summarised that ‘the local cultural 
setting is very different… It’s a militarised 
society. In Australia, it’s OK to admit that you 
don’t know something, it’s a courageous thing 
to do, a good even. But here, you should never 
admit that you don’t know something... It’s a 
challenge to adjust to things in here’ (Erbil, 16 
April 2019). Even those who stay, often end up 
living in a ‘bubble’, surrounded by other 
returnees, where they can preserve their 
lifestyle. One of the interviewees in Kurdistan 
observed that her university, her workplace, 
has become this kind of bubble: 
 
This university is open-minded and open 
internationally. But in a way this is a virtual 
society that I’ve built for myself. They say 
that it’s difficult to integrate into a new 
society. But I think that it’s much more 
difficult to reintegrate into a society that you 
have left. It’s more difficult because we try to 
integrate, but we cannot 100 percent. You 
have come back here, and you have 
changed. You adopted different principles, 
different things. So you also come to believe 
that you are different from the rest of 
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society. Returnees end up feeling isolated (Erbil, 
16 April 2019). 
This sense of isolation has probably been 
bolstered by the returnees’ own sense of mission 
and belief in their ability to bring to a change. An 
interviewee in Somaliland told that ‘a lot of 
diaspora have what we call a diaspora saviour 
complex. They think that because they are [from] 
abroad they are better than the people, you think 
you can do things better. But it’s not always the 
case’ (Hargeisa, 10 December 2018). And a 
South Sudanese returnee reflected that ‘I had to 
learn how to listen to them because what 
happens most of the time is we think we know 
everything. So to develop things you have to 
listen to people and understand how things work’ 
(Juba, 6 March 2019). One Kurdish interview 
starkly analysed the situation: 
 
You plant a seed in a soil, and it grows in a 
particular environment. Then you move it to 
another environment, which has many hostile 
species. It won’t be able to grow, unless it 
adapts to conditions around it. And this is what 
diasporas need to do. They need to really 
understand the environment they are coming 
into. Otherwise they become preachers. And 
you know what happens to preachers (Erbil, 16 
April 2019). 
Perhaps the greatest challenge facing returnees, 
nonetheless, has been prejudices and hostility 
toward them by the local population. The vast 
majority of interviewees identified this as a 
serious issue affecting their lives in the 
homeland. A Kurdish returnee, an academic, told 
that ‘We encountered internal racism, or perhaps 
not racism – but there are certain people who 
don’t like us to come back. They don’t want us 
back because we are taking their jobs. I’ve heard 
the term “imported Kurds”’. Such perceptions, 
he recounted, cost him potential jobs in 
Kurdistan (Erbil, 17 April 2019). The theme of 
jealousy or envy of those holding dual 
citizenship has appeared in many of the 
interviews. But also that of fear, of 
competition over resources. One interviewee 
in Kurdistan recounted that ‘When I come 
from the outside, the person who is less 
capable is scared for his position. And he will 
face me. That’s a natural thing. I have heard 
the word transplant. It is painful’ (Erbil, 16 April 
2019). Others have been accused of 
disloyalty. A South Sudanese returnee bitterly 
recalled that ‘some people look down at you. 
They try to cast doubt about your loyalty to 
the country… Some, out of envy, have said, 
during the fighting [the civil war] that “oh, the 
diaspora, now they are going to run away, use 
their passports and leave the country”’ (Juba, 
13 March 2019). And another reported that ‘If 
there is dislike in the country about 
Americans, people blame you for being an 
American who tries to stabilise the country. 
It’s not uncommon’ (Juba, 10 April 2019). And 
a Kurdish interviewee narrated that ‘People tell 
you “you have a passport, you can leave 
whenever you want…” In 2014 [when ISIS 
threatened Kurdistan], many of those with 
foreign passports left. My friends and even 
students, said “now you are going to leave.” I 
didn’t leave… But we have to prove that we are 
invested here’ (Erbil, 24 April 2019). 
 
This hostility has real implications for the 
work and activism of returnees. As noted 
above, several returnees admitted that this 
treatment, even if by a minority of the 
population, makes them hesitant to publicly 
express their political views or directly 
address policymakers. The above-mentioned 
South Sudanese interviewee warned that 
‘Those who come from the diaspora, they 
don’t feel comfortable here, because they are 
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seen as a threat, and this is because of their 
superior knowledge. But this feeling has started 
to change’ (Juba, 13 March 2019). One 
interviewee in Juba even described the situation 
in terms of fighting: ‘some of the returnees are 
targeted. They are hated for coming from 
abroad… There’s almost a sense of fighting 
between the locals, people who’ve come back 
from the diaspora, who have come from 
Khartoum, from Kenya, all of these groups of 
people’ (Juba, 4 April 2019). And an interviewee 
in Somaliland, who shifted from working for an 
international NGO to the government specified 
that 
 
I can’t hide that I’m diaspora because they can 
tell by the way I speak Somali so they already 
have an opinion about me.  This makes it 
difficult to do my job.  I used to work for NGOs 
and it was easier because it’s more 
international, but I jumped into the government 
to see that I’m here to stay and will get there 
one day! So working for government as 
diaspora is hard, because of your opinions and 
the way you speak Somali is weak, so they can 
tell you what to do because you are just like a 
child for them. What they will tell you is “You 
are diaspora and we run things in here 
differently than you do it normally”’ (Hargeisa, 6 
December 2019). 
Within this framework of prejudices, questions of 
gender have also appeared. Female returnees 
from the diaspora have been the subject of 
misconceptions and insults. According to one 
interviewee in Kurdistan, ‘Many people think that 
I’m easy to get, because I lived in Germany – 
because they think German girls are also easy to 
get. Of course, this is not true. But this is one of 
the prejudices that people have about me’ (Erbil, 
26 April 2019). Another interviewee in 
Kurdistan reiterated this notion: ‘they have this 
conception that girls coming from diaspora 
are not as descent as the ones here, which is 
completely wrong. They have this view that 
Kurdish girls in Europe are easy and that. They 
consider us as less descent’ (Sulaymaniyah, 
23 April 2019). And in Somaliland, a returnee 
reported on an anecdote of a similar spirit: 
 
We have the office for Diaspora Affairs in 
Somaliland. I went there in the first week 
that I arrived. I filled in so many forms, and 
made a statement. I told them, “I want to be 
useful to the community. Put me in any 
place that you feel I can be useful for.” It 
didn’t happen. They didn’t call me back. Well, 
they did call me back, but not for that 
reason. Some young guy who was there 
called me, trying to track me up. He felt “oh, 
there’s a young lady from England, she is 
new and fresh and has no idea”’ (Hargeisa, 
20 January 2019). 
There were only a few statements on this 
issue, but they give another indication of what 
returnees may face in the homeland. 
 
On the other hand, and this is perhaps a 
reason for optimism, returnees have 
developed strategies and ways to cope with 
such hostility. A South Sudanese interviewee 
pointed out that ‘those who came back have 
learned the context where the country is, what 
are the issues and how things are done’ 
(Juba, 23 May 2019). These ways of coping 
and strategies have mainly revolved around 
developing a thick skin toward such attitudes, 
a greater understanding of their new 
environment, and emphasis on excelling in 
their work. A Kurdish interviewee summarised 
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his effort in that ‘I established connections and 
people know me, they know my ideas and goals. 
And now they are more willing to accept me. But 
if I had come from Sweden straight with Swedish 
mentality to try change things, this wouldn’t 
work’ (Erbil, 17 April 2019). Another interviewee 
confirmed that: 
 
I have found different ways to cope with such 
challenges. I always prove that I was right, and 
by time they realise that the way I offered 
should have been implemented... But it’s also 
about working with them, and whenever I work 
with them, even if takes a lot of effort, I try to 
show them how to do things (Erbil, 24 April 
2019). 
For others, the strategy has involved a firm 
standing on their ground, without hesitating to 
confront their accusers. As one Somalilander 
returnee put it, when attacked on his 
background, ‘I challenge them back, I put them in 
their place’ (Hargeisa, 9 December 2018). 
Alternatively, others have chosen to invest more 
in learning about their homeland: 
 
There are many people who come here [to 
Somaliland] with high expectations and then 
they get disappointed. So my advice to them is, 
when you come here, don’t expect too much. 
You come here just as a normal Somali or 
Somalilander if you want. Learn more about 
yourself, because you learn more about 
yourself when you are in your homeland. Have 
a clear purpose, but do not overly think that 
purpose (Hargeisa, 27 December 2019). 
 
 
Overall impact and contribution 
Notwithstanding the challenges they have 
faced, many of the interviewees confidently 
pointed out the achievements their work, 
activism and participation in general have had 
over society and politics in the homeland. 
They have related this not to their 
independent work, but to their integration into 
existing advocacy networks, civil society 
movements and other positions that have 
enabled them to work with local actors, 
mainly through sharing their experiences. The 
article has already mentioned above 
successful campaigns in which returnees 
have participated, such as the anti-trafficking 
legislation and the introduction of 
environmental laws in Kurdistan. But 
examples are ample. An interviewee in 
Kurdistan played a key role in forming one of 
the first shelters to LGBT subjected to 
persecution and threat (Sulaymaniyah, 2 May 
2019). In Somaliland, one interviewee was 
involved in drafting legislation to register all of 
the currency exchange companies operating 
in the country and set them with a daily rate 
(Hargeisa, 10 December 2018). Another 
founded a consortium for NGOs and 
international organisations tackling 
malnutrition (Hargeisa, 27 December 2018). 
Another interviewee in Hargeisa, advancing 
prisoners’ rights, was successful in 
introducing vocational training programmes 
to prisoners, this is a country where such 
concept as prisoners’ rights never really 
existed: some of the inmates have been able 
to find jobs because they got qualifications 
from the UN, that they are qualified, and they 
can work in these roles’ (Hargeisa, 3 
December 2018). In South Sudan, one 
interviewee working for a UN agency on the 
subject of IDPs insinuated a close 
collaboration with policymakers at different 
levels, testifying that ‘We work closely with the 
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ministers of foreign affairs and the interior. We 
do a lot of things. I can’t elaborate, but I’ve 
worked on drafting bylaws’ (Juba, 14 May 2019). 
And another interviewee, working for an NGO 
advancing public health, participated as an 
advisor in parliamentary discussions that to the 
increase of maternity leave from 60 to 90 days 
(Juba, 20 February 2019). And another 
proclaimed that due to his training of judges and 
policemen in areas of Equatoria, as part of his 
work for a capacity-building programme set by a 
UN agency, ‘the rate of arbitrary detention has 
been reduced dramatically’ (Juba, 21 February 
2019). 
 
Naturally, one should be cautious about taking 
testimonies at face value. But even if some of 
these testimonies are exaggerated for self-
gratification, they still reflect the agendas of 
returnees, the way they may defer from stayees’ 
and their strategies for achieving such changes. 
Moreover, for many of the interviewees, their 
achievements and changes they brought have 
not been at the government or other decision-
making levels. Rather, they have been at the 
grassroots level, among their relatives and 
communities. Thus, the interviewee advancing 
LGBT rights told that ‘My mom is a very religious 
person. She didn’t believe in LGBT [rights]. But 
when I explain to her, she says “do your best to 
protect them from being killed.” At least I 
changed my mom’s mind. It is a good thing for 
me. It was not easy’ (Sulaymaniyah, 2 May 
2019). For another interviewee, a journalist and 
documentary moviemaker, introducing new 
techniques and practices of journalism to his 
colleagues has been a great achievement (Erbil, 
14 April 2019). In Somaliland, one interview was 
able to tell that a subsidised football academy he 
founded has brought in together 1,300 kids, boys 
and girls, from all over Hargeisa, enabling 
members of different clans and parts of the city 
to integrate better than many other frameworks 
(Hargeisa, 4 December 2018). For another, 
describing clan politics as a source of 
instability in Somaliland, even avoiding asking 
job applicants at her organisation for details 
that could disclose their clan background has 
served as setting an example to her 
colleagues (Hargeisa, 6 December 2018). As 
one Southern Sudanese interviewee 
concluded, 
 
In my interaction with my family, my voice 
has been valued. As you probably know, in 
South Sudanese society, the male family 
members are the ones who have the last 
word. But in my family, even my older 
brothers consult with me. They listen to my 
suggestions and come for my advice. People 
have also been more receptive to my ideas. 
If we talk about girls’ education… I feel that 
my listeners can value my advice and my 
input. This is because I present the example 
of a female who is educated, but at the same 
time a female who respects and values her 
community (Juba, 19 March 2019). 
In light of these achievements, many of the 
interviewees, though again not all, have 
concurred that the diaspora should play an 
active role in the socio-political development 
of the homeland. As a South Sudanese 
interviewee phrased it, ‘diaspora have a 
special space that they need to occupy here, 
in order to bring about change. Their 
knowledge and their experience from 
wherever they are coming from can contribute 
in terms of bringing new technologies, civil 
society, trying to bring about change in the 
country’ (Juba, 2 May 2019). A Kurdish 
interviewee remarked that ‘It is good to 
transfer the experience, the knowledge you 
gained abroad back to your country. It is 
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[diaspora involvement] a great opportunity to 
build a great society here (Sulaymaniyah, 2 May 
2019). And a Somalilander returnee suggested 
that ‘We need doctors, nurses, and teachers so 
we need everyone here to work together; locals 
need to give the chance to those young 
professionals’ (Hargeisa, 20 January 2019). 
 
Others, though, had reservations about the influx 
of returnees. One interviewee in Somaliland 
maintained that ‘I think a lot of diaspora either 
become part of the problem or part of the 
solution so I would say it is 50/50… For example, 
if something happens, diaspora can fly out 
immediately, but local people will stay here so 
this is when they become part of the problem 
(Hargeisa, 4 December 2018). And a South 
Sudanese interviewee commented that ‘Diaspora 
should be more active in South Sudan, but in a 
constructive way. If they start talking about 
issues they don’t understand, they could only 
make things worst’ (Juba, 19 March 2019). A 
Kurdish interviewee explained that ‘We are 
lacking a structure. And therefore, if anyone is 
coming within this confusion, they would 
confuse people here as well. I wouldn’t 
necessarily recommend them to return’ (Erbil, 16 
April 2019). This recommendation also had a 
practical consideration: ‘Sometimes they are 
more useful there than in here. In the 1990s, 
when the situation was bad, their economic 
support was crucial. I would suggest instead 
keeping some links’ (ibid). Another interviewee in 
Kurdistan reiterated this logic: ‘I think we need 
the diaspora everywhere in the world to promote 
the Kurdish cause and show the world who the 
Kurdish people are… It's better if they work better 
where they are and contribute to the countries 
that they are in’ (Duhok, 24 April 2019). 
 
Those who have wished to see greater 
involvement of the diaspora in homeland affairs, 
nevertheless, admitted the need for governments 
and international organisations facilitation of 
return to the homeland. A Kurdish interviewee 
elucidated that ‘Women prefer to stay in the 
West; they don’t want to come to this prison. 
Change in women rights is essential to attract 
diaspora people. More openness in society, 
more equality between men and women, 
equal pay, just being treated equally’ (Duhok, 
23 April 2019). And a Somalilander interview 
simply concluded that ‘I would raise 
awareness for both locals and diaspora. 
Where diaspora needs to be patient and to 
make locals understand that they need to 
start benefiting from diaspora and that they 
are not coming back to get their jobs’ 
(Hargeisa, 20 January 2019). And a South 
Sudanese interviewee urged his government 
to 
 
have resources from outside of the country 
that they can tap into… There are many 
people who want to come and be part of the 
change, but they have no basis to come 
back to. They have never seen the country 
since the time they left. How do we make 
them move here? These are very important 
things and maybe one day, the government 
and donor community may decide to design 
a programme that would allow the diaspora 
to come back and be part of the nation-
building (Juba, 6 March 2019). 
Such concrete plans, nevertheless, have yet to 
be designed among governments and 
international organisations. 
 
Findings and Conclusion 
While the experiences of individuals may 
undoubtedly be different to an extent, one can 
identify recurring themes, experiences and 
perceptions. These perceptions cross sectors, 
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groups and countries. First, the motivations for 
members of diaspora communities to return to 
their homelands are multiple and intertwined. 
The vast majority of the interviewees noted that 
the desire to bring to develop the homeland was 
an essential part of their decision to return. In 
several cases, this was intertwined with the 
desire to reunite with their families. For others, it 
was the hope to expose their children to the lives 
and customs in the homeland, to instil them 
identity and a sense of belonging to the 
homeland. But in most cases, returnees stressed 
their desire to return and contribute to the 
homeland and its society. Even if this was an ex 
post facto justification, it still indicates the 
significance that returnees pay to their seeming 
obligation to contribute to the society that had 
sent them – and then received them back. 
 
All of the interviewees, with no exception, 
cherished the experience that they gained 
through their lives in the host country. The vast 
majority of interviewees have expressed pride in 
their belonging to the host country. The 
experiences that they gained in the host 
countries, through their education and exposure 
to Western norms and practices, have been 
portrayed as key to their participation in public, 
social and political life in the homeland. When 
asked about the advantages of being diasporans 
for their activities, the only near-consensus 
answer has been that the life in the West has 
made returnees more involved citizens, with 
higher expectations of their governments and 
authorities. 
 
Many of the returnees downplayed the idea that 
coming of the diaspora has opened doors for 
them. Most acknowledged that their access to 
education abroad, their knowledge of foreign 
languages, and professional experience had 
given them advantages of the locals in 
competition over jobs, including positions in 
government and the civil service. But they have 
also stressed that without merit, such 
advantages mean little beyond the initial 
footstep. Most have stressed that the most 
considerable advantage of having a foreign 
passport is the mobility that it has allowed 
them, which most of the locals are denied. But 
for most, the passports did not seem to 
provide a sense of protection or greater 
freedom – again, at last, based on their 
statements. 
 
Along with these advantages, most 
interviewees admitted the existence of 
disadvantages or challenges stemming from 
their status as returnees. The challenge 
mentioned most frequently is that of 
resentment because of jealousy. Interviewees 
noted that their advantages as diaspora 
returnees - many of the interviewees related 
this to competition over employment and the 
threat that they present to stayees. Being 
absent, and enjoying the ‘streets paved of 
gold’ in the West, at times when the stayees 
had suffered hardship during times of conflict 
and poverty, has also been used against 
returnees. However, perhaps the most critical 
challenge from this report’s perspective, 
though not mentioned very frequently, is the 
fact that returnees often end living the ‘ex-pat 
life’. That is, returnees end up somewhat 
isolated from the community, as they mostly 
engage with other returnees and essentially 
recreate their lives in the host country. One, of 
course, may argue that people of similar 
educational, economic and cultural 
background tend to coalesce everywhere and 
that this is not unique to the cases in 
question. But if there is a potential for 
diaspora returnees to serve as a transnational 
civil society, such isolation can be a 
hindrance. Overall, nonetheless, the vast 
majority of diaspora returnees have 
maintained that their status and situation has 
been far more advantageous than 
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disadvantageous. Most have developed 
strategies to overcome the challenges and 
advance in their fields.  
 
These findings have important policy 
implications, for donor organisations and 
governments, the homelands, and the diaspora 
communities themselves. Donor organisations 
and governments should take further steps to 
institutionalise the involvement of the diaspora in 
overseas developmental campaigns. This is 
especially true in cases of homelands where the 
government does not have institutions in place 
to foster diaspora’s involvement in the social and 
political affairs of the homeland. Donor 
organisations and agencies, such as DFID (e.g. 
2014; 2013) have identified the importance of 
diaspora participation in various aspects of 
social, political and cultural development in the 
homeland. Nevertheless, not much has been 
done so far to institutionalise and organise such 
engagement. 
 
This is not without risks; diaspora returnees to 
the homeland means a potential brain drain for 
the host countries. The emigration of well-
education, socially and politically conscious 
individuals, who may eventually choose to stay in 
the homeland may not be desirable for 
governments in the host countries. Yet, the 
benefits in terms of international development 
may exceed the shortcoming mentioned above. 
Moreover, it is necessary to bear in mind, as 
much as returnees view the homeland as a 
significant part of their identity, they are also 
strongly connected to the so-called host country. 
Another potential hindrance to organising 
diaspora activism by donor states is the 
sensitivity involved in such action. Encouraging 
individuals to engage with, or travel to the 
homeland may signal to them that the donor 
agency or government view them as foreigners 
in their own country. Undoubtedly, helping 
diaspora organisations and institutions should 
be done with high sensitivity. Agencies and 
organisations should not target individuals, 
but seek existing diaspora platforms and 
collaborate with them. 
 
One way in which aid agencies and donor 
governments can support greater diaspora 
involvement in the homeland, and thus turn 
diasporans into a more influential 
transnational civil society, is through funding 
diaspora initiatives, in both the host country 
and homeland. Through such collaboration, 
donors may fund workshops and training 
programmes that would inform diaspora 
returnees and travellers. Such workshops 
could highlight to the returnees their 
advantages and how they can be utilised to 
the social, political and economic 
development in the homeland. But such 
workshops could also unveil to returnees the 
difficulties they may face upon returning to 
the homeland. If facing difficulties in the 
homeland bears the risk of returnees leaving 
the homeland back to the host country, 
knowledge about these potential challenges 
may reduce their costs for returnees. 
 
Governments in the homeland may also 
contribute by finding ways to integrate 
diaspora returnees in society. If isolation and 
living in a ‘bubble’ is something that some 
diaspora returnees seek to avoid, 
governments could initiate a growing 
interaction between returnees and stayees. 
Being aware of the, often not unjustified, fear 
and resentment expressed by stayees toward 
returnees, governments may find ways to 
highlight the contribution of returnees to the 
homeland. In the long term, returnees could 
serve as a catalysator for a long-term change 
in education, health and policymaking in 
general. 
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